Sanne Verschuren, Assistant Professor of International Security at the Pardee School of Global Studies, has published a new article in the Journal of Strategic Studies on September 21, 2026, examining an enduring puzzle in international security: why states repeatedly pursue collaborative military technology projects despite their frequent failures. In her article,“Why interstate arms collaborations fail: The commitment-implementation paradox in the context of NATO BMD,” Verschuren argues that many multinational defense initiatives contain the very conditions that ultimately undermine their success.

Drawing on the case of NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD), Verschuren introduces what she calls the “commitment-implementation paradox.” States often enter collaborative arms projects because they promise technological innovation, economic efficiencies, and enhanced security. Yet the factors that make these partnerships attractive in the first place frequently create obstacles once implementation begins. As a result, projects can become more expensive, more complex, and less effective than originally envisioned.

Verschuren identifies three key sources of this paradox. The first is the imbalance of power among participating states. Powerful countries can encourage or pressure smaller partners to join ambitious projects, but those same power differentials can later create tensions over technology sharing, decision-making authority, and access to critical information. The second challenge stems from competing national priorities. To secure broad participation, collaborative projects often try to satisfy different political, industrial, and military goals simultaneously. While this approach helps build coalitions, it can also increase organizational complexity, costs, and technical difficulties. The third challenge is the pursuit of deep coordination. Greater integration promises substantial benefits, but aligning technologies, doctrines, and institutions across multiple countries often proves far harder than anticipated.

The article illustrates these dynamics through NATO’s efforts to develop and operationalize missile defense capabilities between 2010 and 2026. Although NATO members broadly agreed on the value of missile defense, allies differed on how the mission should be structured, funded, and implemented. The result was a patchwork of nationally procured systems, differing strategic priorities, and ongoing challenges in integrating technologies and decision-making processes across the alliance. According to Verschuren, these difficulties demonstrate how the conditions that encourage international cooperation can later generate friction and implementation problems.

By tracing common patterns across the development, procurement, and operation of military technologies, Verschuren offers a new framework for understanding innovation failure in international security. Her findings suggest that successful defense cooperation requires careful attention not only to securing commitments from partners, but also to designing projects that remain manageable once implementation begins. As governments increasingly turn to multinational partnerships to address evolving security challenges, the article provides timely insights into the opportunities and pitfalls of collaborative defense initiatives.