In most low- and middle-income countries, municipalities do not collect enough tax revenue from their populations to fund the water, health, education, and transportation infrastructure their citizens require. This project examines which municipalities are better positioned to secure discretionary funds from higher tiers of government for local infrastructure projects. Scholarship on distributive politics emphasizes that funds typically flow to jurisdictions with core voters (controlled by aligned politicians) or those with significant numbers of swing voters. This project, however, emphasizes an alternative predictor: municipal population size. Mayors and municipal councilors in smaller municipalities have less revenue available for infrastructure projects, creating stronger incentives to lobby for funds. Infrastructure projects in smaller cities are more visible, making credit-claiming and credit-attribution efforts more effective. Using an original dataset of approximately 65,000 project-specific budget amendments made by national deputies to Brazilian budget legislation from 2015 to 2023, we find an inverse relationship between municipal population size, per capita spending, and project count. This relationship is particularly strong for infrastructure projects. Deputies, however, award simpler, cheaper projects to smaller municipalities, reflecting concerns about state capacity.